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3. Agents, Icons and Idols
Pascal Perez
Abstract
Since the early 1960s, Artificial Intelligence has cherished the ambition to design
an artificial cognitive machine able to reproduce intimate aspects of human be-
haviour. Distributed Artificial Intelligence and its most recent avatars—Multi-
Agent Systems—have developed the concept towards social interactions and
societal dynamics, attracting the attention of sociologists and ethnographers
who found new ways to elaborate or validate their theories. But populations of
cognitive agents aren’t the real thing, despite the efforts of their designers.
Furthermore, one must cautiously examine the rationale behind these often in-
credibly complex arrangements of algorithms, in order to assess the usefulness
of such exercises. As a matter of fact, Artificial Intelligence relies on a very
positivist, and sometimes reductionist, view of human behaviour. For centuries,
from Bacon to Pierce, philosophy of mind has provided meaningful insights that
challenge some of these views. More recently, post-normal approaches have
even taken a more dramatic stand—some sort of paradigm shift—where direct
knowledge elicitation and processing override the traditional hardwiring of
formal logic-based algorithm within computer agents. Keywords: Agent-Based
Modelling, Artificial Intelligence, Icon, Idol, Philosophy of Mind, Cognition.
Introduction
Scientists developing Multi-Agent Systems, as part of Distributed Artificial In-
telligence (DAI), tend to focus on individual components interacting within a
given system (Gilbert and Troitzsch 1999). This is a purely bottom-up approach
where representations of the individual components, the agents, display a large
autonomy of action. Hence, system-level behaviours and patterns emerge from
a multitude of local interactions. Intentionality is deliberately placed at the level
of the agents to the detriment of the system itself, greatly limiting its ability to
control its own evolution. In the case of human ecosystems, agents can represent
individual actors or relevant social groups and communities (Bousquet and
LePage 2004). The following definition of a Multi-Agent System (MAS) is gener-
ally admitted. A MAS is a conceptual model of an observed system that includes:
• an environment (E), often possessing explicit metrics;
• a set of passive objects (O), eventually created, destroyed or modified by the
agents;
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• a set of active agents (A). Agents are autonomous and active objects of the
system;
• a set of relationships (R), linking objects and/or agents together; and
• a set of operators (Op), allowing agents to perceive, create, use, or modify
objects.
An agent is a physical or virtual entity that demonstrates the following abilities:
autonomy, communication, limited perception, bounded rationality, and decision-
making process based on satisfying goals and incoming information (Ferber
1999). A Multi-Agent Based Simulation (MABS) is the result of the implementation
of an operational model (computer-based), designed from a MAS-based concep-
tual representation of an observed system. The strength of MAS approaches
consists in their ability to represent socially and spatially distributed problems.
Meaningful examples of application are to be found in ecology (Janssen 2002),
sociology (Conte and Castelfranchi 1995), or economics (Tesfatsion 2001).
Cederman (2005) asserts that generative process theorists in social science,
shifting from traditional nomothetic to generative explanations of social forms
and from variable-based to configurative ontologies, may find in Multi-Agent
Systems relevant tools to explore the emergence of social forms in the Simmelian
tradition, thanks to common foundations in both epistemology and ontology.
In the following sections of this chapter, we try to evaluate Cederman’s assertion
against evidence. First, we describe general features of cognitive agents as stated
and used in Artificial Intelligence (AI) research. Then, we argue that our under-
standing of mental processes, from Bacon’s idols to Tversky’s prospect theory,
is inherently limited. In the third section, we question the supposed objective
autonomy of agents, drawing from Peirce’s icons and Varela’s enactive cognitive
theory. Finally, we propose a way forward that encapsulates the designer and
the modelling process into the observed system itself.
Cognitive agents
Kenetics (Ferber 1999), as a theory, aims to establish principles for conception,
design, and implementation of computational Multi-Agent Systems. These sys-
tems of interacting agents are described in terms of components (agents), structure
(network of agents), and organisation (ways and reasons for agents to interact).
As intentionality is embedded into the agents, they need mental-like processes
for decision and action. Drawing from traditional psychology, AI tends to de-
scribe and explain human behaviour through mental states representing beliefs,
desires, and intentions (Brazier et al. 2002). The Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI)
paradigm, largely used in AI, states that individual decisions arise from the re-
cursive exchange of information between these three mental states (Figure 3.1).
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Figure3.1.Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) structure of a conative system
Source: Brazier et al. 2002
Jacques Ferber (1999: 242), in his design framework for MAS, proposes a more
comprehensive classification of these mental states, he calls cognitons, for which
Table 3.1 gives a partial list organised into categories. These different categories
represent different sub-systems interacting during cognitive processes.
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Table3.1.Partial list of Cognitons proposed by Ferber
DescriptionCognitonCategory
Cogniton transmitted by external sensorsPerceptInteraction
Cogniton transmitted by another agentInformation 
Cogniton selecting actionDecision 
Cogniton transmitted to another agentRequest 
Cogniton imposed by the social organisationNorm 
Cogniton representing states of the world and selfBeliefRepresentation
Possible representation not yet believedAssumption 
Cogniton resulting from impulse or demandTendencyConative
Internal need coming from the conservative systemImpulse 
External need resulting from request or perceptDemand 
Internal duty for decisionIntention 
Cogniton selecting decisionCommand 
External constraint on decisionEngagement 
Set of rules and techniques to implement actionMethodOrganisation
Set of stages needed to implement action or methodTask 
Source: Ferber 1999
Interaction system
The interaction system enables the agent to perceive and acquire information
from the surrounding environment. This individual perception contributes to
the elaboration of a subjective, limited, and contextual representation of the
world.
From a philosophical perspective, there are two conflicting theories on perception.
On one hand, the Aristotelian view assumes that perceived objects actively
‘impregnate’ our senses. Thus, we passively receive this imprint and integrate
it to our cognitive system. This causal conception of perception asserts that we
can access the objective qualities of surrounding objects. This model is widely
accepted in cognitive science (logic theory) and computer science (shape recog-
nition). On the other hand, the Kantian view asserts that percepts are constructed
by the observer and depend upon previous experiences of perception. This
active conception of perception constitutes an axiomatic principle in semiotics
and it is consistent with major experimental results in neurobiology. Unfortu-
nately, its application to computer science raises several technical problems that
have, so far, limited its use in AI despite valuable experiments such as the
‘Talking Heads’ (Kaplan 2001). Figure 3.2 presents two computational systems
of perception for artificial agents based on active or passive perception.
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Figure3.2.Passive and active perception systems. (Adapted from Ferber
1999)
System of representation
The system of representation enables the cognitive agent to store and manipulate
acquired knowledge and beliefs. AI tends to group knowledge, know-how, ex-
perience, facts, and memories into a single set of information called ‘beliefs’.
These beliefs help the agent to decide and to implement actions. As a matter of
fact, much theoretical work has been concerned with ways of representing,
classifying and manipulating these beliefs for action (pragmatic dimension) rather
than focusing on the very essence of ‘knowledge’ (epistemological dimension).
The Physical Symbol System Hypothesis, enunciated by Simon and Newell, is
the founding principle of Symbolic Artificial Intelligence (SAI). Borrowing
concepts from philosophy of mind (Kantian schemata) and semiotics (Peircean
symbols), the principle states that any belief can be represented through a set
of symbols and rules of inference (ontology). Four axiomatic propositions are
generally accepted:
• Representations are independent from any underlying physical structure.
• Mental states are intentional: they are linked to a referent external to the
agent.
• Representations are made of symbols or groups of symbols.
• Reasoning consists in manipulating symbols with rules of logic inference.
Evidence coming from neuro-biology has supported criticism of the first propos-
ition by Connection Artificial Intelligence (CAI). The use of neural networks for
task-oriented reasoning has indeed provided powerful alternate solutions. But,
a more general criticism towards SAI relates to its implicit assumption of perfectly
autonomous agents. As a matter of fact, social agents are embedded into an en-
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vironment that not only supports and feeds individual reasoning but, more es-
sentially, ‘permeates’ individual experiences through permanent interactions.
Social psychology asserts that intelligence is culturally grounded and that
knowledge evolves only through interaction with others by means of proposition,
confrontation, and refutation (Cole and Scribner 1974). Interestingly, this same
criticism gives some credit to the unique concept of belief used by SAI to describe
different types of knowledge: from a social psychology viewpoint, any type of
knowledge results from a historically contingent and socially built consensus.
Hence, scientific knowledge and theories are themselves meta-beliefs, consensual
models of a given ‘reality’.
From an SAI perspective, agents continually use beliefs and assumptions (cog-
nitons) from their system of representation to build descriptive or predictive
models of their environment. Ferber (1999) proposes the following list of belief
categories:
• Environmental belief: current or predicted state of the physical environment.
• Social belief: social norms and rules applicable within a given social group.
• Relational belief: competences and intentions attributed to other known
agents.
• Personal belief: representation of self.
Conative system
The conative system defines the set of activities to be undertaken by an agent,
based on available information and beliefs. The ways agents take their decisions,
and the reason why they discard some options to focus on others, are questions
that stretch well beyond Artificial Intelligence and nurture endless debates in
philosophy and psychology.
As SAI relies upon logic inferences to describe an agent’s behaviour, such as
predicate logic or modal logic, causality links are meant to be rational. Hence,
agents tend to display goal-satisfying decisions and, therefore, their actions are
first driven by their needs and tendencies. According to Ferber (1999), these
tendencies are themselves motivated by percepts, impulses, norms, or engage-
ments, and trigger a decisional process based on existing beliefs and assumptions
(Figure 3.3). Like beliefs, motivations can be separated into four categories:
• Environmental motivation: reflex or reinforcement due to percepts.
• Social motivation: engagement due to social norms or deontic rules.
• Relational motivation: engagement or hedonism linked to other interacting
agents.
• Personal motivation: self-engagement or hedonism due to impulses.
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Figure3.3.Conative system and its two sub-systems. (Adapted from: Ferber,
1999)
The way SAI agents take intentional decisions and eventually undertake sub-
sequent actions is largely based on causal philosophy of action (Bratman 1987).
Intention is altogether a choice and an engagement towards this choice. Hence,
in AI, an agent X is said to have the intention to perform an action A if X wants
a proposal P about the state of the world to be true, and:
• X believes that P is a consequence of A,
• X believes that P is not currently realised,
• X believes he is able to perform A,
• X believes that A is possible and, consequently, P will be satisfied.
Cohen and Levesque (1990) have proposed a formalism for rational action, based
on modal logic that has been largely used in Distributed Artificial Intelligence
(DAI). Their formalism gives way to necessary, possible, or contingent predicates.
Likewise, it allows expressing the temporality of intentions as planning to do
something in the future, and needs a different set of tasks compared with deciding
to do something now. Applying such formalism to Multi-Agent Systems implies
that each agent is able not only to predict the consequences of its intended action,
but also to anticipate the results of the other agent’s behaviour. Hence, the agent
needs to carry in his social or relational beliefs some ideas about the other agent’s
commitments. This is where the concept of engagement becomes paramount:
self and social engagement are needed to introduce some sort of regularities in
the system that can be hopefully anticipated.
Organisation system
Finally, the organisation system, through its methods and tasks (cognitons), allows
the agent to prioritise, halt, and resume the pending decisions provided by the
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conative system. External information channeled through the interaction system
may alter the implementation of a decision into action. A suspended decision
will eventually resume according to the persistence of its triggering intention(s)
(Ferber 1999).
Exploring human ecosystems
It is one thing to understand how SAI is used to design rational and intentional
cognitive agents. But we also have to question the reasons why, in the first place,
we intend to create these artificial entities? I will leave aside DAI applications
belonging to robotics or computer-oriented technologies where autonomous
agents tend to ‘mimic’ intentional cognition in order to perform actions con-
sidered as rational by their designers. After all, these agents are not supposed
to be, or even to represent, human beings.
Instead, I will concentrate on these Multi-Agent-Based Simulations (MABS) that
are meant to represent actual human ecosystems. Only a small proportion of
those applications are used as social virtual experiments to explore cognitive
processes. Relying on robust cognitive architectures inherited from SAI, these
models are designed to help theoretical breakthroughs:
I believe that the contribution of [Multi-Agent-Based Social Simulation]
to the theoretical development of the cognitive and social sciences could
be really remarkable. SS can provide not only an experimental method,
but good operational models of cognitive ‘actors’, of the individual social
mind, of group activity, etc. Models that can be richer, more various,
and more adequate than those provided by economics, without being
less formal. In particular, my focus on the core relation between functions
and cognition was aimed at pointing out how the coming ‘agent-based’
approaches to social theory, using learning but deliberative agents, could
deal with very old and hard problems of the social sciences and could
re-orient them.
(Castelfranchi 2001: 35)
As a matter of fact, a large proportion of MABS applications are designed to ex-
plore and understand complex interactions between actual actors and their en-
vironment. Bousquet and LePage (2004) or Hare and Deadman (2004) provide
comprehensive reviews of these models. Most of these applications depart from
the SAI paradigm and implement over-simplistic, task-oriented, rule-based
agents, focusing on spatial interactions, social communication and individual
mobility. Often, the drift from internally consistent and Formal Logic Compliant
(FLC) agents is justified by synthetic information coming from field surveys or
expert knowledge.
34
Complex Science for a Complex World
I would argue that in both cases, formal logic compliance or not, MABS will fail
to deliver if we cannot find innovative ways to link the model, its object, and
its interpreter. For deceptive idols and socially constructed icons are conspiring
against agents.
Deceptive idols
Cognitive agents are supposed to behave rationally, as they represent rational
human beings. FLC agents abide by a positivist and scientific rationality, and
need a consistent set of decisions to act. Non-compliant agents (FLN) are usually
designed according to the phenomenological interpretation of behaviour given
by experts (i.e. sociologists, anthropologists). In both cases, the question is not
about the acceptance of a rational behaviour. The question is about the axiomatic
predicates used by the agents, or interpreted by the experts.
Bacon’s idols
In his Novum Organum, Francis Bacon classified the intellectual fallacies of his
time under four headings which he called idols (Nova Organum 1620: 345:39):
There are four classes of Idols which beset men's minds. To these for
distinction's sake I have assigned names, calling the first class Idols of
the Tribe; the second, Idols of the Den; the third, Idols of the Market
Place; the fourth, Idols of the Theater.
An idol is an image, in this case held in the mind, which receives veneration but
is without substance in itself. Bacon did not regard idols as symbols, but rather
as fixations. In this respect he anticipated modern psychology.
'Idols of the Tribe' are deceptive beliefs inherent in the mind of man, and
therefore belonging to the whole of the human race. They are abstractions in
error arising from common tendencies to exaggeration, distortion, and dispro-
portion. First of all, our tendency to let emotions rule reason can give us false
impressions of the truth based on our feelings at the time. Another common idol
lies in our tendency to seek out evidence of that which we already believe to be
true. Bacon suggests that we become affectionate to ideas we have found and
carried with us for some time; we become attached to them and collect evidence
that supports them while throwing out that which contradicts them. Interest-
ingly, Castelfranchi (2001) proposes a similar mechanism to explain the emergence
of social functions among agents through ‘learning without understanding’
processes, superseding the intentional cognitive processes. But, so far, emotional
agents remain out of reach of the current developments in SAI.
'Idols of the Den' (also called 'Idols of the Cave' in some editions) are those which
arise within the mind of the individual. Like in Plato’s allegory, thoughts of the
individual roam about in this dark cave and are variously modified by tempera-
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ment, education, habit, environment, and accident. Thus an individual who
dedicates his mind to some particular branch of learning becomes possessed by
his own peculiar interest, and interprets all other learning according to the colors
of his own devotion. In our case, this idol may affect directly the designer rather
than the artificial agent. Lissack and Richardson (2001: 101) give an illustration
of this bias in their criticism of Wolfram’s claim that most complex systems can
be accurately represented by rule-based atomistic models:
The act of interpreting differs from the act of observing, and both may
differ significantly from the underlying phenomenon being observed.
In their failure to respect this distinction, strong MSM proponents
[Wolfram and colleagues] are implicitly suggesting that the interpretation
is reality. However, while a good model of complex systems can be
extremely useful, it does not allow us to escape the moment of
interpretation and decision.
Obviously, deterministic and limited expert knowledge used to design FLN
agents suffers the same type of criticism. Causal rules of behaviour inferred by
an expert are merely subjective interpretations of a given reality. Putting it
simply, there are as many realities as there are experts. Agar (2005) recently
proposed a way forward by means of coupled emic/etic approaches to social
simulations. The author advocates a constant feedback between what makes
sense for the actual actors depicted in the model (emic) and what seems meaning-
ful to the designer (etic).
'Idols of the Marketplace' are errors arising from the false significance bestowed
upon words, and in this classification Bacon anticipated the modern science of
semantics. The constant impact of words variously used without attention to
their true meaning often betrays their purpose, obscuring the very thoughts
they are designed to express. Acknowledging the volatility of the ‘true mean-
ing’of words, Bacon just caught a glimpse of the active perception, theorised by
Kant and Peirce later on. Words, as elementary percepts, do not carry any spe-
cific and intrinsic meaning when they are perceived. They have to be re-inter-
preted internally by the receiver, according to previous knowledge and envir-
onmental hints. Maturana and Varela (1980: 32) propose to drop the denotative
understanding of language altogether in favour of a connotative approach:
So long as language is considered to be denotative it will be necessary
to look at it as a means for the transmission of information, as if something
were transmitted from organism to organism, in a manner such that the
domain of uncertainties of the 'receiver' should be reduced according to
the specifications of the 'sender'. However, when it is recognized that
language is connotative and not denotative, and that its function is to
orient the orientee within his cognitive domain without regard for the
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cognitive domain of the orienter, it becomes apparent that there is no
transmission of information through language. It behooves the orientee,
as a result of an independent internal operation upon his own state, to
choose where to orient his cognitive domain; the choice is caused by the
'message', but the orientation thus produced is independent of what the
'message' represents for the orienter. In a strict sense then, there is no
transfer of thought from the speaker to his interlocutor; the listener
creates information by reducing his uncertainty through his interactions
in his cognitive domain.
As stated earlier, mainstream SAI satisfies itself with passive perception processes.
Hence, most FLC agents can receive intelligible and meaningful information from
other agents, without having to engage into deciphering and re-interpretation
stages. Somehow, it makes agents’ lives seem much easier than ours!
'Idols of the Theatre' occur due to sophistry and false learning. These idols are
built up in the fields of theology, philosophy, and science, and, because they
are defended by learned groups, are accepted without question by the masses.
When theories have been cultivated and have reached a sufficient level of con-
sensus they are no longer questioned. The long standing hegemony of the sym-
bolico-cognitivist paradigm cannot hide the fact that relevant alternatives have
challenged SAI’s dominion: connectionist and evolutionary theories perform
better on learning processes (Kaplan 2001); the autopoietic theory, by refusing
the conveyance of information through linguistic interaction, provides a unified
and unchallenged approach to signaling interactions (verbal, non-verbal, or
extra-verbal) through structural coupling between individuals (Maturana and
Varela 1980).
Prospect theory
Prospect theory focuses on cognitive and psychological factors that determine
the value of risky prospects (Kahnemann and Tversky 2000). Its initial assumption
is that subjective values attached to gambling are carried by expected changes
of wealth (gains or losses) rather than ultimate states of wealth. More importantly,
prospect theory replaces the traditional concept of risk aversion by a more intu-
itive one, called loss aversion, by which people tend to consider that a loss of
$X is more averse than a gain of $X is attractive. This assumption explains why
people might be risk seeking, and no longer risk averse, in the domain of losses.
Though trivial from an espistemological viewpoint, Prospect theory tends to
reconcile theoretical development with empirical facts. According to Kahnmann
and Tversky (2000:1):
The study of decision addresses both normative and descriptive
questions. The normative analysis is concerned with the nature of
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rationality and the logic of the decision making. The descriptive analysis,
in contrast, is concerned with people’s beliefs and preferences as they
are, not as they should be.
Although based on formal logic predicates, Prospect theory recognises the fact
that part of the knowledge necessary to complete the theory is inherently elusive.
It is possible to design FLC agents founding their decisions on this theory, but
the axiomatic predicates that will tell us about discrepancies between gains and
losses, or the way different items will be affected by these discrepancies remain,
by far, out of reach.
Furthermore, prospect theory threatens directly two logical pillars of decision
theory traditionally used by SAI: preference invariance and value coincidence.
Invariance requires that the preference order between prospects should not de-
pend on the manner in which they are described. Kahneman and Tversky (2000:5)
have demonstrated that invariance cannot generally be satisfied: ‘invariance is
normatively essential, intuitively compelling, and psychologically unfeasible’
due to the framing of outcomes through formulation effects. The framing effect
also affects the relation between experience and decision values. But rational
agents seldom make a difference between experience values (direct outcomes of
actual actions) and decision values (expected outcomes of an anticipated choice).
These two values tacitly coincide, despite Kahnemann’s and Tversky’s (2000:
16) warning:
Some factors that affect experience are not easily anticipated, and some
factors that affect decisions do not have a comparable impact on the
experience of outcomes.
Cognitive dissonance
For Bacon, knowledge is intimately mixed with the idols, hence prefiguring our
modern concept of belief. More importantly, Bacon draws visionary consequences
from the presence of the idols, in terms of communication (Nova Organum 1620:
346:35):
enter quietly into the minds that are fit and capable of receiving it; for
confutations cannot be employed, when the difference is upon first
principles and very notions and even upon forms of demonstration.
Individuals and groups exhibit varied responses when faced with new informa-
tion. If such information is consistent with extant behaviours and beliefs, it can
be readily accepted and integrated. However, if the new information conflicts
with behaviour and belief, the resulting state is described as ‘cognitive disson-
ance’ (Bradshaw and Borchers 2000). According to the theory, the inconsistency
and psychological discomfort of cognitive dissonance can be reduced by changing
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one's beliefs, values, or behaviour. Dissonance can also be avoided by rejecting
or avoiding information that challenges belief systems or by interpreting disson-
ant information in a biased way. In this regard, most SAI structures force agents
to discard new information conflicting with a given set of consistent predicates.
It is only through reinforcement (punishment or reward) due to experience that
contrasted set of predicates can be established. Elaborating on the conflicting
views upon ‘uncertainty’ between scientists and policy-makers to explain the
science-policy gap, Bradshaw and Borchers (2000: 3) outline the complexity of
cognitive dissonance:
Dissonance between existing beliefs and new information may be shaped
by a host of factors, all of which inhibit the rate at which scientific
findings are assimilated into policy. In what we have called the ‘volition’
phase of the science-policy gap, public debate around an emerging
scientific consensus may derive from a combination of cultural,
psychological, and economic interests threatened by the policy inferences
of dissonant scientific findings.
The authors particularly point at the contrasted rhetorical figures used by sci-
entists when they are in charge of policy-making compared with their usual
handling of scientific uncertainties. Designers in DAI have tried to encapsulate
these internal cognitive conflicts by implementing Agent-Group-Role structures
in which one agent belongs simultaneously to several socio-cultural groups and
plays different roles accordingly (Ferber, 1999). But the internal conflict resolu-
tion mechanisms—for example, between friendship engagement and professional
commitment—rely on formal and individualistic logic once more.
Overall, despite the increasing interest in, and use of Multi Agent Systems to
represent human ecosystems, the SAI paradigm remains mostly unchallenged
as a theoretical framework used to develop cognitive agents. But looking at the
real world through the lenses of the social sciences, we have to acknowledge
the fact that a meta-theory of human behaviour doesn’t exist yet. Rational de-
cision theory, prospect theory, social learning theory, and others give us partial
clues about human behaviour, and none can stand as an overarching and unified
framework.
Hence, we must handle cautiously Cederman’s assertion about the ‘New Deal’
offered by Multi Agent Systems to social scientists. These tools and their current
states of application generally rely upon reductionist views of the world: sym-
bolico-cognitive hypothesis, formal predicate logic, rational decision, and
autonomy. As a matter of fact, the SAI paradigm stands out as a nomothetic
meta-model for agent’s behaviour while its foundation doesn’t represent a meta-
model of human behaviour but merely a partial interpretation of it.
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Socially constructed icons
Beside the symbolico-cognitive paradigm, Multi Agent Systems explicitly em-
phasise the autonomy of agents through physical integrity, autonomous decision,
and rational action. But social psychology (Cole and Scribner 1974), psychology
of development (Papert 1980) and collective action theory (Oliver 1993) insist,
for different reasons, on the fact that human beings are social beings before
anything else: learning processes, cognitive inferences, or individual actions are
shaped and dictated by our environment. Recent developments in DAI have
tried to incorporate this ‘sociality’ dimension into agent’s behaviour. We’ll come
back in the next section to Hogg’s and Jennings’ (2001) proposal to include social
rationality into agents’ expected utilities, or Jager’s and Janssen’s (2003) attempt
to consider basic human needs and uncertainty as the driving factors behind
decision making processes of their agents. But first, we need to understand the
elements of social cognition that weaken the foundations of the SAI paradigm.
Peirce’s icons
Charles Sanders Peirce, a founder of modern semiotics, has asserted that:
• we cannot think without signs,
• we have no ability for intuition, all knowledge flows from the former
knowledge,
• we have no ability for introspection; all knowledge about the inner world
is produced by hypothetical reasoning on the basis of observation of outer
things. (Peirce Edition Project 1998)
On this solid foundation he builds up his entire theory of signs. Being a pure
positivist himself, at least during his early career, Peirce is convinced to build
a theory based on formal logic, independent from particular minds, and charac-
terised by a triadic relation (Peirce Edition Project 1998: 411):
[semiosis is an] action, or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation
of three subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this
tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions
between pairs.
Peirce suggests that people have not and cannot have direct access to reality.
Signs are nothing else than the universal medium between human minds and
the world. Semiotics defines different categories of signs according to their level
of abstraction, from icons to symbols (Peirce Edition Project 1998). As a primary
and elementary sign, an icon looks like it is signified. There is no real connection
between an object and an icon of it other than the likeness, so the mind is re-
quired to see the similarity and associate the two. A characteristic of the icon is
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that by observing it, we can derive information about its significance. Hence,
semiotics embrace the Kantian concept of active perception as stated previously.
Since signs are not private but socially shared, it is society that establishes their
meaning. Therefore, the transcendental principle in semiotics is not (divine) in-
tuition, but community, and the criterion of truth, social consensus. According
to Peirce, any truth is provisional, and the truth of any proposition cannot be
certain but only probable. Umberto Eco, in his exhilarating Kant and the Platypus,
provides a vivid description of this fallibilism principle (Eco 1997: 98):
Naturally at this point transcendentalism will also undergo its Copernican
revolution. The guaranty that our hypotheses are ‘right’ will no longer
be sought for in the a priori of the pure intellect but in the historic,
progressive, and temporal consensus of the Community. Faced with the
risk of fallibilism, the transcendental is also historicized; it becomes an
accumulation of interpretations that are accepted after a process of
discussion, selection, and repudiation. This foundation is unstable, based
on the pseudo-transcendental of the Community.
In order to sort out conceptual confusions born from consensual uncertainties,
Pierce uses a ‘pragmatic’ approach by linking the meaning of concepts to their
operational or practical consequences. This pragmatism will act later on as a
corner stone for SAI’s intentionality of beliefs. But, when conventional SAI says:
‘beliefs are intentional’, semiotics tell us: ‘we have to consider beliefs as intention-
al’. Somehow, SAI has developed an hyper-positivist approach of cognition,
through passive perception, intentionality, and formal modal logic that has gone
beyond the scope of its theoretical background. In this regard, FLN agents are
more likely to ‘mimic’ social behaviour compared with their FLC counterparts
as the rationale for their actions is inferred from an holistic, though subjective,
view of the social system constructed by their designer. In other words, some
behavioural rules have to be considered for the FLN agents to interact in a con-
sistent way (system level), without prerequisite conditions on cognitive consist-
ency (agent level). But we’ll see in the next section that it comes at a cost.
Enactive cognitive theory
We human beings are living systems that exhibit cognition, and there is no way
for us to address, much less explain, our cognitive abilities without employing
those same cognitive abilities. To date, the primary response to this paradox has
been to ignore it and proceed with respect to a presumably fixed fundament,
external to our act(s) of cognition. Where the presumptive fundament is an
‘objective reality’, the mediation between situation and action is explained in
terms of ordered inference with respect to a model of that reality.
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Maturana and Varela (1980) questioned this conventional approach when it is
confronted with the tacit, extralinguistic, or emotive character of human beha-
viour. They further disputed the ‘objective reality’ concept by considering:
• Ourselves operating in multiple ‘worlds’, particularly socio-cultural ones.
• A ‘world’ being molded by contextual factors intertwined with the very act
of engaging it.
Their autopoietic theory considers living beings as living systems embedded
into larger systems constituted by themselves and the environment they interact
with. The theory addresses the basic configural and operational circularities of
these living systems (Maturana and Varela 1980). Unlike other more positivist
approaches to complex systems, the autopoietic theory focuses on the observer
himself. It accomplishes this by shifting explanatory focus from atomic units in
an objective world to essential relations among processes operating in circular
ways to constitute the organism as a living system and the observer as a cognitive
organism. As clearly stated by Maturana (Maturana and Varela 1980: 7):
Cognition is a biological phenomenon and can only be understood as
such; any epistemological insight into the domain of knowledge requires
this understanding.
Later on, Varela and colleagues brought phenomenological concerns into the
world of cognitive science (Varela et al. 1991). Their goal was to incorporate
everyday experience into the scope of studies which had heretofore addressed
cognition in terms of disembodied rational processes, circumscribed by abstract
beliefs purported to mirror an objective milieu. All concepts fully accepted by
symbolico-cognitivist approaches. Varela and colleagues proceed from the as-
sumption that experience necessarily predates and underpins enquiry. Maintain-
ing a focus on experience as action allows inspection and reflection on the
manner in which ‘mind’ and ‘body’ reciprocally engage to consummate experi-
ence. Midway between cognitivist and connectionist paradigms, their Enactive
Cognitive theory considers that (Varela et al. 1991: 148):
context-dependent know-how [shouldn’t be treated] as a residual artifact
that can be progressively eliminated by the discovery of more
sophisticated rules but as, in fact, the very essence of creative
cognition…Knowledge depends on being in a world that is inseparable
from our bodies, our language, and our social history—in short, from
our embodiment.
As such, enactive cognitive theory does not address cognition in the currently
conventional sense as an internal manipulation of extrinsic information or signals,
as semiotics or symbolico-cognitivism would have us believe (we have seen
above how Maturana and Varela treat linguistic interactions) . Instead, it grounds
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cognitive activity in the embodiment of the actor and the specific context of
activity. The theory fits very well with current trends toward emphasising
contextualised studies of humans, their interactions, and their social systems.
Unlike symbolico-cognitivist approaches, the enactive cognitive theory is con-
sistently ‘relativistic’ in the sense that any given observation is observer-
bounded, history-contingent, and socially embedded.
The theory implies an epistemology analogous to that of constructivism (Funtow-
icz and Ravetz 1993). For this reason, Multi Agent Systems built from FLN agents
and based on expert knowledge never describe the reality as it is but rather a
probable reality interpreted by a given observer in a given context. It means that
such models cannot be evaluated through traditional scientific methods but need
to be assessed, in context, against a set of criteria intelligible to the observed
subjects and to the observer.
Social constructions
As mentioned above, very influential studies in social sciences have focused on
the embodiment of cognitive activities into the actor’s experiences. In the psy-
chology of development, Piaget asserted that children only develop through
progressive interactions with their environment (Papert 1980). In the early stages
of development, Piaget’s theory suggests that learning comes only from unexpec-
ted changes in the environment of the subject. Changes create a cognitive imbal-
ance that must be adjusted through assimilation, the new experience is integrated
into the current view of the world, or accommodation, the current view of the
world must be modified to fit in the new experience. From this constructivist
viewpoint, imbalance is no longer considered as a negative factor but rather as
a driving force towards cognitive development. Hence, a perceived environmental
unstability seems to trigger some sort of phase transition, in a complexity theory
sense, from one state of representation to another. It is interesting here to draw
a link with the enactive cognitive theory, for which concrete experiences (know-
how) are driving cognitive processes through connotative interactions (Maturana
and Varela 1980).
Indeed, a new picture of cognitive processes takes shape; a mind submitted to
perpetual changes and characterised by a dynamic equilibrium between past
and current views of the world; a mind dominated by inductive inferences and
desperately trying to make sense of incoming information through deductive
and formal logic (Batten 2000). This description sharply contrasts with the well
structured and perfectly organised mind proposed by SAI designers. As a matter
of fact, FLC agents process information in a consistent way; their actions are
driven by intentional cognition and the experienced outcomes are evaluated
against expected utilities (Brazier et al. 2002).
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Marvin Minsky, in his famous Society of Mind (1985), proposed an alternate
solution to the symbolico-cognitivist theory. Drawing from an initial intuition
that our mind is made of structural and independent units called frames, Minsky
views the human mind itself as a vast society of individually simple processing
agents. The agents are the fundamental thinking entities from which minds are
built, and together produce the many abilities we attribute to minds. The advant-
age in viewing a mind as a society of agents, as opposed to the consequence of
some formal logic-based system, is that different mental agents can be based on
different types of processes with different purposes, ways of representing
knowledge, and methods for producing results. The consistency of this atomistic
mental system rises from the organisation of interactions between agents, not
from a unified and coherent reasoning (Minsky 1985: 308):
What magical trick makes us intelligent? The trick is that there is no
trick. The power of intelligence stems from our vast diversity, not from
any single, perfect principle.
In principle, these networks of mental agents display dynamic interactions where
agents can be modified, created, or deleted in order to adapt or to respond to a
given experience. This interactionist theory can accommodate—though not ex-
plicitly formulated—constructivist (Papert 1980) and connotative (Maturana
and Varela 1980) standpoints. Unfortunately, to date, few Multi Agent Systems
have been implemented according to Minsky’s views, and a vast majority of
these models concern robotics or computer-oriented technologies. Both fields
have been excluded from the scope of this paper.
Another advantage of the interactionist theory is that it creates a continuum
between individual and social actions. The same paradigm is used from mental
processes to collective action, from personal engagement to societal norm enforce-
ment. As a matter of fact, sociologists studying social movements often refer to
Collective Action Frames to represent the process by which activists create and
modify action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate
the activities of a social movement (Benford and Snow 2000). A crucial aspect
of collective action frames is that they are not merely aggregations of individual
attitudes and perceptions but also the outcome of negotiating shared meaning.
Collective framing necessitates complex interactions between activists, antagon-
ists, bystanders, and observers (op. cit.: 614):
Frames help to render events or occurrences meaningful and thereby
function to organize experience and guide action. Collective action frames
also perform this interpretive function by simplifying and condensing
aspects of the ‘world out there’, but in ways that are intended to mobilize
potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and
to demobilize antagonists.
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Cederman’s quest for generative explanations of social forms based on configur-
ative ontologies cannot be entirely satisfied by autonomous and rational agents,
as formal modal logic constitutes a very specific and limited type of ontology.
As we have seen, the interactionist paradigm offers a much richer context for
cognition and sociation. Unfortunately, technical caveats have prevented so far
to implement purely interactionist computer models beyond experimental and
limited applications. Finally, Cederman’s call to the Simmelian tradition questions
the nature of these social patterns we are supposed to observe: if we accept
Maturana’s and Varela’s views, these patterns are strongly observer-dependent
and they need a constructivist epistemology for authentication.
Paradigm shift
From the previous sections, we can infer the following:
• The symbolico-cognitivist paradigm relies upon a limited, fragmented, and
sometimes conflicting understanding of cognition and behaviour.
• Autonomy of cognition is inherently limited as beliefs are socially constructed
and experience preempts cognition.
• A model of social behaviour – as a tentative representation of an objective
reality – cannot be separated from its designer’s experience and viewpoint.
• Multi Agent Systems are specific models that display autonomous and cog-
nitive entities, hence, they are concerned with the three previous limitations
altogether.
Systems built with FLC agents suffer mainly from the first and second limitations.
They tend to limit the subjectivity of the representation by adhering to a con-
sensual theoretical framework of reference. But the SAI paradigm itself could
be considered, in a Baconian sense, as an idol of the theatre altogether. Systems
built with FLN agents suffer mainly from the second and third limitations. They
accept our limited understanding of cognition by way of pragmatism. But they
are intimately related to their designer’s experience.
In all cases, the power of explanation of a given model can hardly be assessed
through traditional scientific positivism as soon as human cognitive processes
are simulated. If it were the case, a set of explanatory hypotheses could be used
to unambiguously validate the simulated processes against objective criteria. So
far, in the absence of any meta-theory of human behaviour, only experimental
economics and experimental psychology are used to inductively validate these
models, with all the unrealistic constraints imposed to these experiments. Nev-
ertheless, our next section provides meaningful examples of attempts to refine
the symbolico-cognitivist approach in order to match the reality of socially em-
bedded behaviours.
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As mentioned above, Agar (2005), dealing with very elusive behaviours of illicit
drug users, advocates a dual approach of modelling where actor-based compon-
ents (emic) are used along with theory-based components (etic) in order to im-
plement realistic behavioural and social models. Of course, this proposal assumes
that ethnography or sociology can provide in situ replicable and explicit methods
of knowledge elicitation. Dray et al. (2006) have recently tried to formalise such
a process, using knowledge engineering techniques. If these techniques allow,
in principle, a better traceability of elicited knowledge we have to consider
Cole’s and Scribner’s (1974) findings from their cross-cultural studies: any given
ethnographic experimental setting reflects its designer’s own beliefs and inten-
tions. Therefore, the authors advocate a constant cross-validation between the
observer and the observed subjects in order to limit misinterpretation. Maturana
and Varela (1980) would label these iterative and circular interactions between
a designer, an observer, and observed subjects, a structural coupling process.
It is the fundament of the post-normal approach to modelling proposed by
Funtowicz and Ravetz (1994) and described below.
Normal views on social rationality
Kluver and colleagues (2003) point out the main difference in building theories
between social sciences and natural sciences. The latter always proceed through
increment, starting with rather simple models and enlarging them by successive
steps, whenever the progress of research made it necessary. This normal science
is guided by a certain paradigm that is transformed into an increasingly complex
model as long as the paradigm makes it possible. By contrast, social sciences often
adopt an all-at-once approach by which theorists try to capture from the begin-
ning as much of social complexity as they can within their conceptual framework.
Kluver and colleagues have no doubt about the fact that social sciences must
embrace a normal posture in order to progress towards a better understanding
of social complexity (2003: 3):
That is not possible in computational or mathematical sociology,
respectively: the basic models must be simple in order to understand
their behaviour in principle. The enlargement of the basic models that
is always necessary in advancing research can only be done if this basic
understanding has been achieved. Therefore the social sciences have to
adopt this methodical procedure from the natural sciences if a formally
precise theory of social complexity is to be achieved.
The SAI paradigm has supported, through normal and positivist procedures,
the implementation of always more complex models of individual decision and
social behaviour. If emotional decisions or the ‘embodiment’ of cognition are
still on the shelves, the social rationality of agents, as opposed to their goal-sat-
isfying rationality, has recently attracted much attention. Hogg and Jennings
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(2001: 382), recognising that individual and social concerns often conflict leading
to the possibility of inefficient performances, proposed a framework for making
socially acceptable decisions, based on social welfare functions, that combine
social and individual perspectives:
To be socially rational, an individual maximizes his social welfare
function over the different alternatives. This function represents how
an individual agent may judge states of the world from a moral or social
perspective by taking into consideration the benefit to others of its course
of action and weighing it against its own benefits.
The dynamic balance between individual and social utility functions is controlled
by a metalevel controller that considers available resources (adaptation) and past
experiences (learning) to tune the amount of cognitive efforts put into social
rationality. An equivalent mechanism is used by Castelfranchi (2001) in order
to formalise social functions (or roles) assumed by individuals as non-intentional
mental processes. In this case, a metalevel controller supersedes the intentional
and rational system of the agent. A learning-without-understanding process re-
inforces mechanically some individual beliefs, whether they are beneficial for
the agent or not.
In both cases, the cognitive architecture becomes increasingly complex and the
normality paradigm appears to act as a ‘patching’ process applied on a system
of formal inferences that was not designed for such a purpose in the first place.
Furthermore, these architectures and organisations seldom rely on direct evidence
for validation. Instead, virtual social experiments are used to generate results
that are evaluated against plausible utility values at the system and individual
levels.
In order to overcome the increasing complexity of SAI architectures, and to fa-
cilitate, to some extend, the direct validation of the building assumptions, Jager
and Janssen (2003) propose an alternate formalism. Their consumat theory is to
be considered one of these conceptual jumps characteristic of the evolution of
normal science: a new paradigm supports the creation of simpler models compared
with the previous ageing generation. The consumat approach considers basic
human needs and environmental uncertainties as the driving factors behind
decision making processes. Agents engage in different cognitive processes, in-
cluding social imitation and comparison, according to their perceptions of indi-
vidual needs and environmental threat (Figure 3.4). Hence, the consumat
paradigm overrides two structural limitations of the symbolico-cognitivist
paradigm: experience preempts cognition and social rationality is directly built
into intentional processes. Being at an early stage of development, the new theory
relies on relatively simple rules that can be validated against experimental eco-
nomics settings.
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Figure3.4.Structure of a Consumat agent
Source: Jager and Jannsen 2003
A post-normal temptation
Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993) also use environmental uncertainties, along with
decision stakes, to analyse problem-solving strategies in the context of environ-
mental and population risk policy issues. They argue that traditional scientific
methodologies are ineffective when either attribute is high. Instead, they propose
a new scientific posture they call post-normal science (op. cit.: 739):
In those circumstances, the quality assurance of scientific inputs to the
policy process requires an ‘extended peer community’, consisting of all
those with a stake in the dialogue on the issue. Post-normal science can
provide a path to the democratization of science, and also a response to
the current tendencies to post-modernity.
The dynamic of resolution of policy issues in post-normal science involves the
inclusion of an adequate set of legitimate participants in the process of quality
assurance of the scientific inputs. For example, persons directly affected by an
environmental problem will have a keener awareness of its symptoms. Thus,
they perform a function analogous to that of peer-reviewers in traditional science,
which otherwise might not occur in these specific contexts. Closer to the concern
of this chapter, Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993: 745) challenge the commonly ad-
mitted rationality of decision and action:
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Until now, with the dominance of applied science, the rationality of
reductionist natural-scientific research has been taken as a model for the
rationality of intellectual and social activity in general. However
successful it has been in the past, the recognition of the policy issues of
risk and the environment shows that this ideal of rationality is no longer
universally appropriate. The activity of science now encompasses the
management of irreducible uncertainties in knowledge and in ethics,
and the recognition of different legitimate perspectives and ways of
knowing.
Now, let’s put this post-normal scientific posture into the context of our chapter.
Among the majority of MABS used to explore human ecosystems, a significant
number are meant to demonstrate how individuals and populations interact with
their environment, as well as the environmental and social consequences of these
interactions (Bousquet and LePage 2004). These situations are often characterised
by:
• The presence of different groups of actors with contrasted, even conflicting,
strategies.
• Irreducible uncertainties in representing and predicting responses from the
environment.
• Individual and social rationalities based on multiple and competing utility
functions.
• Self-referential conditions limiting goal-satisfying decisions to sub-optimal
solutions.
• Emotional and cultural responses to policy incentives or penalties.
• Important framing effects and asymmetry of information.
We have to accept the fact that Multi Agent Models, even the more sophisticated
ones, will always be pale copies of the original, subjective and partial represent-
ations of a dynamic reality. But recognising this very peculiar fact doesn’t mean
that these models are useless, even Lissak and Richardson (2001: 105) in their
criticism of computer-based social models admit that:
There is no need for the models in question to have predictive power,
despite the strong desire of both consultants and their clients that such
models ‘work’. The pedagogical value of exploring the interactions of
complex relations through the manipulation of models is more than
enough to justify the efforts that go into model development and
proliferation. Clearly, it is easier to manipulate a computer model than
a fully fledged ‘in reality’ laboratory experiment, but the limitations of
such models must be remembered.
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Chefs-d’Oeuvres are chiselled by talented craftsmen, not by their tools. Talent
is all about sharing a vision and choosing the appropriate tools. In this regard,
we must admit that the ultimate criteria of validation for this type of model is
its actual appropriation by the final users (policy-makers, local communities, or
else) and the consensual acceptation of the simulated outcomes. In this case, we
can infer that:
Due to irreducible uncertainties and complex interactions within human ecosystems,
social simulation designers should abide by a principle of subsidiary formalism. The
principle acknowledges the fact that the most reliable source of knowledge about
human decisions and behaviour are indeed the actors of the real drama themselves.
Hence, the principle of subsidiarity stipulates that designer’s cognitive efforts should
be directed towards engaging with real stakeholders and eliciting their own mental
models in the first place. Only when this option is unrealistic, the designers shall
make it clear to everyone that decisional rules and algorithms are derived from
theoretical or empirical predicates.
The subsidiarity principle offers a non-threatening opportunity for ethnography
to accept the challenge of a new and dynamic formalism, beside narratives
(Lansing 2003). The principle also mitigates the accusation of mere indexicality
uttered by System Thinkers against individual-based simulations (Lissak and
Richardson 2001). Finally, a post-normal posture might help solve the problem
of validation that any complex system model is faced with: partial scientific
validation associated with social authentication legitimate the modelling process
and its outcomes (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993).
Companion modelling
During the early 1990s, Granath (1991) introduced the concept of collective design
in industry to define a process by which all actors involved in the production,
diffusion, or consumption of a product are considered as equal experts and in-
vited to participate to the design of the product. Each expert actively contributes
to the collective process of transdisciplinary creation. Collective design usually
faces two problems:
• socio-cultural barriers between different disciplines or social groups; and
• heterogeneous levels of knowledge and dissonant modes of communication.
Hence, in order to implement a collective design process, it is important to ini-
tially elicit specific knowledge and practices among experts. Then, the process
itself must be grounded into successive mediating objects. These artifacts (ideas,
models, products) are meant to channel creativity and to structure communication
among experts. Collective design is to be considered as a social construct, no
longer functional or rational. The final product emerges from conflicts, alliances,
and negotiations.
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During the late 90s, collective design and other approaches like system thinking
or action learning were appropriated and adapted by scientists working on
natural resource management (Hagmann et al. 2002; Barreteau 2003; D’Aquino
et al. 2003). Interestingly, most of the cases were characterised by:
• direct engagement of science into field management issues (R&D projects);
• complex and adaptive socio-ecological systems (mid-scale with recursive
interactions); and
• important cross-cultural contexts (rural Africa or Asia).
The co-construction of these models with local stakeholders didn’t intend to
provide normative models of reality, instead they were meant to enhance discus-
sion and collective action through interactions around and about the mediating
object (Lynam et al. 2002: 2):
It is important to emphasize that, in the contexts in which these case
studies are presented, the models were used more as part of a process of
developing and exploring a common understanding of problems and
possible solutions. They were not designed to be highly validated,
predictive models in the sense in which systemic models are usually
developed and used. We are not aware of other examples in which local
people, who have no history of computer-based modeling, have been
involved, not only in the use of computer models, but also in their
development.
In these models, agents are designed according to the consensual information
provided by their real counter-parts and the people they interact with. Decisional
or behavioural rules are as complex and rational as the creators wish them to
be. Likewise, agent’s beliefs are tailored according to the phenomenological ex-
pression of the real stakeholder’s mental models (Dray et al. 2006). Hence, this
constructivist and post-normal modelling of cognitive processes doesn’t intend
to tell How does it work?, but rather What is there that is so important? But Becu
and colleagues (2003) give evidence that the phenomenological expression of
personal beliefs and intentions might not provide a consistent enough set of
rules or assumptions to be directly encapsulated into the agent.
Recently, a group of scientists, Collectif ComMod, has decided to formalise their
approach in order to establish deontic rules for developing companion models
by direct interactions with local stakeholders (Collectif ComMod 2005). Compan-
ion modelling (ComMod) is an approach making use of simulation models in a
participatory way to understand and facilitate the collective decision-making
process of stakeholders sharing a common resource. The principle is to identify
the various viewpoints and subjective referents used by the different stakehold-
ers, and to integrate this knowledge into simulation models that serve as medi-
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ating objects. There is an iterative process of confrontation between factual
evidence, model design, and scenario exploration (Figure 3.5). Other mediating
objects or methods are usually used in conjunction with computer simulations,
like role-playing games (Barreteau 2003; Dray et al. 2006). The different stake-
holders, including researchers, aim at working out a common vision of the
common resource management that highlights the diversity of interests. This
approach has attracted growing attention from decision-makers and community-
based organisations in order to engage more dynamically with stakeholders.
Figure3.5.Traditional cycle of interactions during a companion modelling
process
Conclusion
We have taken Cederman’s assertion as a pretext for a journey through the world
of artificial agents. From SAI to ComMod, we have drifted from positivism to
constructivism, from a normal kind of science to a post-normal one. Despite the
weaknesses and flaws pointed at in this chapter, the author, like Cederman, be-
lieves that Multi Agent Systems (MAS) offer a fantastic opportunity for the social,
natural, and computer sciences to come together and engage in a ‘new kind of
science’, much more challenging in epistemological terms than Wolfram’s original
proposal (see Lissak and Richardson 2001). Unlike Kluver and colleagues (2003),
we think that there is a way for social sciences to appropriate computer formal-
isms without falling into a reductionist and positivist stand. The enactive cog-
nitive theory (Maturana and Varela 1980) and the interactionist theory (Minsky
1985) need to be re-visited in a transdisciplinary manner. They can provide a
theoretical substance to a vast majority of MAS applications built with non-
formal logic compliant agents. The validation of these models needs to be embed-
ded into a constructivist perspective where designers, users, and stakeholders
not only evaluate the simulated outcomes, but also participate in the modelling
process itself (Granath 1991; Collectif ComMod 2005).
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Progressing on to the constructivist path doesn’t mean that we have to discard
the symbolico-cognitivist paradigm altogether. The strong, but limited, edifice
proposed by SAI has shown undisputable capacities in producing replicable
methods to test assumptions or benchmark findings on rational decision and
action. For example, recent work from Castelfranchi (2001) or Hogg and Jennings
(2001) are coming closer to designing realistic socially rational agents. But,
paraphrasing Lissak and Richardson, ‘the limitations of such models must be
remembered’. Beyond the scope of this paper, the same type of warning must
be addressed to social network theory and its extensive use of graph theory to
explain social interactions (Borgatti and Foster 2003). Graphs are merely symbols,
in a Peircean sense, displaying some sort of likeness with reality, they are not
reality.
Finally, we have to agree with Cederman (2005) on the potential usefulness of
Multi Agent Systems for social scientists. But we have to be aware of the fact
that the symbolico-cognitive paradigm inherently limits the range of generative
ontologies to be created. We have to take even more cautiously his reference to
Simmelian social patterns. These patterns are subjectively construed by the ob-
server, they are not the objective reality. Using MABS to replicate these patterns
imposes conditions on the artificial agents that need to be socially validated as
far as traditional scientific validation is no longer relevant in the case of complex
human ecosystems.
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